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When Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans and the levees protecting the city gave way in 
August 2005, an already struggling and weakened criminal justice system collapsed in spectacular 
fashion. 
Damage within New Orleans extended far beyond the loss of physical infrastructure. The 
city’s population was depleted by more than half. For those who remained or returned within the 
first year, spirits were crushed, uncertainty abounded, and the hard work of restoration was riddled 
by anxiety, conflict, opportunism, and battles for precious resources. 
Longtime judge Leon Cannizzaro Jr., appalled at the near-complete dysfunction of the local 
criminal justice system, entered and won the race for Orleans Parish district attorney (OPDA). In 
November 2008, because of the urgency and enormity of the task ahead, he assumed the unexpired 
term of his elected predecessor, Eddie Jordan, who had resigned under clouds of scandal in October 
2007. 
Cannizzaro took office more than three years after the flood waters had receded but found his 
new agency’s building still uninhabitable. While the OPDA’s office had received three to four feet 
of flood water and had been designated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
as a high-priority critical infrastructure, what should have been a fairly easy restoration hadn’t 
begun. Instead, residual moisture from the flood had festered for years, exacerbating the damage 
caused by inundation. 
Their home office still in shambles, prosecutors were working on plastic picnic tables and 
folding chairs inside donated temporary office space in a downtown high-rise across from City 
Hall. The location was more than a mile and a half from the Criminal District Courthouse, New 
Orleans Police Department headquarters, the Orleans Parish Sheriff’s Office, and the partially 
restored Orleans Parish Prison. Assistant district attorneys had limited space for witness interviews 
and were forced to carry large seafood boxes containing case files to their personal vehicles and 
then up the stairs of the criminal courthouse. The walk began from wherever they could find 
parking, first come first served. 
Such logistical difficulties were only the beginning of prosecutors’ troubles, soon to be 
compounded by the shortcomings of sister agencies. 
The sheriff’s office struggled to properly serve court notices and subpoenas and to bring 
detainees from the parish jail, so there was no assurance a defendant would appear at scheduled 
court hearings. Evidence custody could be an issue if a trial was scheduled and then postponed, 
because the NOPD’s Central Evidence and Property Room would provide evidence to OPDA 
investigators but not always take it back. On the rare occasions that both defendant and evidence 
arrived in court at the same time, the absence of an essential witness to whom sheriff deputies 
failed to timely serve a subpoena could force unwanted continuances. Each misstep along the way  
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increased the likelihood of case files, evidence, or even witnesses being lost or misplaced. Too 
many moving parts, it seemed, were moving in wrong directions. 
Reconfiguring the operations of a single inefficient law enforcement agency is daunting 
enough, so imagine the challenge when the entire criminal justice system is disrupted and hobbled 
by multi-agency dysfunction. Three years removed from the city’s great flood, a complete 
makeover was needed, and it would require unprecedented cooperation and effort from all 
stakeholders. 
Post-Katrina rehabilitation was desperately needed on two fronts: the myriad issues related to 
cases pending when the levees failed, and those of the newer, post-flood cases brought by police. 
Cases in the former category were beset by difficulties, such as lost or damaged evidence, 
victims and witnesses who had relocated around the country (often without forwarding contact 
information), and defendants who were incarcerated but dispersed and difficult to locate. 
Defendants who were at-large when the waters rose often simply disappeared, hoping their case 
files were misplaced. If their case files had been located on the ground floor and were water-
logged, sometimes their hopes were realized. 
Newer cases posed their own problems, introduced as they were into an overwhelmed, barely 
functional system. The simple logistics of working space, evidence storage and retrieval, records 
management, process service, and difficulty locating defendants, victims and witnesses likely were 
not being solved with ad hoc solutions. 
Restorative measures also were road-blocked by the poor recent history between the DA’s 
office and the NOPD. New Orleans’ per-capita murder rate had swelled to eight times the national 
average during a period of finger-pointing and feuding between District Attorney Jordan and police 
department leadership. Police complained that the prior DA would not prosecute viable cases. The 
DA staff countered that police would not conduct thorough and timely investigations to produce 
prosecutable cases. 
Violent offenders soon realized the dispute between the agencies meant that only a minimal 
number of murder cases were going to be prosecuted. New Orleans’ streets produced sarcastic 
mentions of the “60-day murder” penalty—the time then allotted under state law for a suspect to 
be arrested and detained, then released if the state had by then failed to institute prosecution. Police 
often failed to provide investigative reports sufficient to support a prosecution within the specified 
time, so cell doors were flung open. Defendants still could be indicted in a state where murder 
charges do not prescribe. But there was no meaningful tracking system to pursue matters once a 
defendant won his pretrial release. 
The acrimony between police and prosecutors boiled over in 2006, when more than three 
thousand of these Article 701 releases effectively terminated prosecutions of cases, including 
murders. New Orleans’ mayor threatened to have District Attorney Jordan investigated for 
malfeasance. City council members and civic groups called for the DA’s resignation. The 
community expressed outrage at the system’s inability to hold violent offenders accountable for 
their criminal acts. The business community finally intervened, funding a soft landing for the DA 
in the private sector in exchange for his resignation and pledge not to seek re-election in 2008. 
It was against this dire backdrop that Cannizzaro took over as the city’s top prosecutor in 
November 2008. He immediately set about evaluating the deficiencies of the DA’s office, as well 
as those of other agencies negatively impacting the performance of the DA’s office. He declared 
that the OPDA no longer would allow underperforming partners in the criminal justice system to 
lower the bar for the prosecutors’ office. But he also ordered a stop to public criticism of the police, 




so that the relationship between the two critical law enforcement partner agencies might be 
repaired. 
Cannizzaro sought to emphasize prosecutions of the most serious and violent crimes. After 
finding that misdemeanor violations consumed more than 40 percent of the Criminal District 
Court’s docket, and that simple possession of marijuana made up about 60 percent of those 
misdemeanor cases, the new DA in 2009 asked the city council to adopt a municipal ordinance for 
the prosecution of minor weed possession in municipal court. The council initially balked, so 
Cannizzaro used his own authority to unilaterally transfer marijuana possession cases to municipal 
court under state jurisdiction. The move immediately freed up about 25 percent of the criminal 
district court docket, and eventually the city council adopted a full range of municipal law 
violations that moved the bulk of misdemeanor cases to the municipal court. 
With the criminal district court docket now leaner, Cannizzaro turned his attention to refilling 
it with the most serious cases of violent crime. He asked the NOPD to begin a cold-case review of 
some 450 murder cases for which prosecution had previously been declined and lobbied the city 
council to double the size of the department’s homicide unit to assist with the task. 
Police, however, were not immediately on board with the new DA’s workhorse ways. NOPD 
Superintendent Warren Riley, maintaining his antagonism toward the DA’s office, actually 
declined the additional resources. So the council instead funded the hiring of six investigators to 
work six months for the DA’s office, reviewing as many of the 450 cold murder cases as they 
could. 
The group got through 150 cases, determining that 75 merited prosecution. But in a little more 
than half of those cases, the investigators found the murder suspects had themselves already been 
killed in subsequent homicides. Retribution killings are a hallmark of New Orleans’ meanest 
streets. 
About thirty-five remaining cases, refused years earlier, were resurrected and indicted, 
resulting in about twenty-seven convictions. It was the start of Cannizzaro’s campaign against the 
city’s murderous offenders that has seen more than seven hundred New Orleans killers 
successfully prosecuted in his first ten-plus years as DA. 
The campaign required another innovation to put the “60-day murder” penalty to rest, and it 
would require a new bridge of trust, respect, and cooperation between the DA’s office and NOPD 
headquarters. A new protocol was negotiated between Cannizzaro’s office and the NOPD’s 
Homicide Division, entitled, “Homicide arrest to indictment in 60 days.” Both agencies pledged 
to improve communication to enhance the likelihood that a homicide arrest would develop into a 
prosecutable case. 
Cannizzaro’s office provided an on-call assistant DA and victim-witness coordinator who 
would accompany a senior investigator to homicide scenes, whether or not an arrest had been 
made. This protocol allowed for immediate interaction between the DA’s office and potential 
witnesses and the victim’s surviving family and demonstrated to detectives the DA’s commitment 
to prosecuting these important cases. The protocol required investigators and prosecutors to meet 
within ten days to discuss a homicide case and to meet again within ten days of an arrest for case 
review and evaluation. Homicide detectives were obligated to submit a complete report to 
prosecutors within twenty-eight days of an arrest. 
That report would become the subject of a charge conference, a weekly meeting between case-
level investigators and prosecutors and their supervisors, where determinations would be made 
about whether cases were ready for prosecution. Previously, these conferences were being held at 
the deadline of a suspect’s release under Article 701. If the investigation was complete and 




sufficient for prosecution, it was accepted. If the investigation was incomplete or deficient in some 
way, it was refused. And under previous DA administrations, that would be that. 
The new protocol required police and prosecutors to begin discussing within a month of arrest 
what problems or deficiencies a case might have, affording time to correct such faults through 
further investigation. Many cases now are reviewed between three and five times in the charge 
conference setting before a charging decision is made. 
This repeated interaction has allowed for more thorough and complete investigations that are 
more likely to result in indictments and convictions. Where under the previous administration, 
about 50 percent of homicide cases were being refused and forgotten by the DA’s office, 
Cannizzaro’s office now accepts homicide cases for prosecution about 90 percent of the time and 
achieves conviction in those cases at an impressive 95 percent rate. 
Rebuilding the relationship between the DA’s office and NOPD not only has enhanced the 
performance of the city’s criminal justice system but undoubtedly has made New Orleans a safer 
city. This cooperative effort to aggressively prosecute serial homicide offenders has contributed 
substantially to the historically low homicide rates of which New Orleans currently boasts. 
 
 
 
 
